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FOUR FUNCTIONS OF MENS REA
WINNIE CHAN AND A.P. SIMESTER*
Everyone agrees that mens rea is relevant to fault. The maxim actus non
fit reus nisi mens sit rea has been around for centuries.1 According to
foundational principles of the criminal law, it is normally not enough
to support a conviction that D perpetrates the actus reus. Neither
should it be. Causing harm to another person may be unfortunate, but
the moral turpitude associated with a criminal conviction requires
some element of fault. And to show that, we need mens rea. The House
of Lords recognized this candidly in Sweet v. Parsley, when holding
that mens rea is a presumed element of all criminal offences:2
there has for centuries been a presumption that Parliament did
not intend to make criminals of persons who were in no way
blameworthy in what they did. This means that, whenever a
section is silent as to mens rea there is a presumption that, in order
to give effect to the will of Parliament, we must read in words
appropriate to require mens rea.
In practice, that presumption is often rebutted, even for some every
serious crimes.3 Yet the very existence of the mens rea presumption
reflects an underlying idea that, unless the harm is caused advertently,
or at least negligently, the attentions of the criminal law are inappro-
priate.
Some common law writers, however, adopt a more comprehensive
analysis. They characterize mens rea as the fault element, suggesting
not only that mens rea helps to establish culpability but, much more
strongly, that this is its essential function. This approach reflects the
understandable thought that the purpose of mens rea elements is to
establish that the defendant has a “guilty mind”.4 It is, after all, mens
rea: the translation to “culpability element” might seem no more than a
* Respectively, Lecturer in Law, University of Warwick; Professor of Law, National University of
Singapore and Fellow, Wolfson College, University of Cambridge.
1 See, e.g., Coke, Third Institute (1641) 6, 107; Fowler v. Padget 7 Term Rep. 514 (Lord Kenyon).
Cf. Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae, 101b; also C.S. Kenny, Outlines of Criminal
Law, 2nd ed., (Cambridge University Press, 1904) 39: “no external conduct, however serious or
even fatal its consequences may have been, is ever punished unless it is produced by some form of
mens rea.”
2 [1970] A.C. 132, 148 (Lord Reid); see also at 153 (Lord Morris) and 162–3 (Lord Diplock). Cf. B v.
DPP [2000] 2 A.C. 428.
3 Notably in under-age sexual offences: now the Sexual Offences Act 2003, ss. 5–8.
4 Nothing turns here on the vexed but semantic question whether negligence is a form of “mens rea”
or mental state, in as much as it may be a fault element without involving any particular state of
mind. For convenience of expression, we assume that it is.
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step in the flight from literacy, the abandonment of yet another Latin
affectation.
That thought should be resisted. Certainly, mens rea in some form is
a necessary component of culpability findings. But it is not sufficient.
Guilt rests on other elements too. Showing mens rea requires only that
the prosecutor establish that the defendant had, at the time of doing the
actus reus, the specified mental state toward that actus reus which is
required for the crime. In itself, this is incomplete. Proof of mens rea
does not establish that the defendant did anything that was culpably
wrong. In particular, she may avail herself of a variety of justifications
or excuses, thereby defraying the attribution of fault despite the pres-
ence of mens rea.5 Even a finding of insanity is compatible with that
conclusion;6 all the more so for the rationale-based defences, such as
self-defence and duress, where the defendant concedes mens rea but
goes on to offer further and exculpating reasons why she chose to do
the actus reus. Mens rea is not the whole of the fault story.
Indeed, liability for a mens rea offence is quite often incurred despite
the absence of moral fault. In the troubling case of Kingston,7 D was
invited to T’s flat, apparently to discuss some business matters. Once
there, he was given coffee which T had laced with disinhibiting drugs.8
D was then led to a bedroom where a fifteen-year-old boy, also drug-
ged, lay unconscious on the bed. D, who had no previous record of
such behaviour, performed non-penetrative sexual acts on the boy.
When charged with indecent assault, D did not allege that he was
unaware of his conduct. At most, he could claim only that, except for
being drugged unawares, he would not have acted as he did. Even so,
the Court of Appeal quashed D’s conviction, characterising D’s intent
as not being a “criminal” intent; a decision that linked the finding of
mens rea directly to considerations of fault.
The House of Lords restored D’s conviction, and ruled that the
absence of blame did not entail the absence of mens rea. Giving the
judgment of the House, Lord Mustill asserted that mens rea is a tech-
nical matter, which requires only that the mental element specified in
the definition of the crime is present. Given that the respondent had
mens rea, the circumstances of the offence warranted mitigation.
5 This holds especially for purely cognitive forms of mens rea such as intention or knowledge. On the
other hand, the presence of a justification may block findings of certain partially evaluative mens
rea elements, such as recklessness or dishonesty.
6 Pace the Divisional Court in D.P.P. v. H [1997] 1 W.L.R. 1406, which ruled that the insanity
defence has no application to strict liability offences, on the basis that the defence operates to
negate D’s mens rea. But a successful plea of insanity is compatible with the presence of mens rea,
at least where D’s condition is such that he lacked knowledge that his act was wrong: M’Naghten
(1843) 10 C. & F. 200, 8 E.R. 718.
7 [1995] 2 A.C. 355 (HL); [1994] Q.B. 81 (CA). Cf. Hinklin (1868) L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, 370–2; Yip Chiu-
Cheung [1995] 1 A.C. 111.
8 It appears from the trial evidence that the defendant was slipped three different kinds of drug,
which were likely to affect judgment, consciousness, and memory.
382 The Cambridge Law Journal [2011]
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 15 Mar 2012 IP address: 137.205.50.42
Whereas no recognised defence was available, however, a conviction
would follow.
One may question Kingston’s conviction, yet the conclusion that he
had mens rea was surely right. If he was not culpable, then in principle
he should not be convicted.9 But that is a matter for the defences.
Perhaps we should craft an “involuntary disinhibition” excuse for rare
cases such as these, although their Lordships saw that framing such
an excuse would not be easy.10 However, we should not conceal the
true difficulty by pretending that someone who does things for good
reasons then lacks “a criminal intention”. A person who shoots another
in self-defence intends to do so. Neither should we accept the analysis
in Williams (Gladstone)11 and Beckford v. R12 that such a person lacks
the intent to act “unlawfully”.13 Rather, he is not culpable: and that is
rightly reflected through a supervening defence.14
Mens rea is not sufficient, then, to establish fault. Moreover, in one
sense it is not even necessary. Certainly, some element of mens rea will
be required before a defendant can properly be treated as blameworthy
for the consequences of his actions. Presaging the famous decision in
Sweet v. Parsley,15 Lord Russell claimed in Williamson v. Norris that
“[t]he general rule of English law is, that no crime can be committed
unless there is mens rea.”16 So should it be. But it does not follow that
every actus reus element should be accompanied by a corresponding
mens rea requirement. Sometimes, constructive liability may be justi-
fied. Hence, in the offence of dangerous driving causing death,17 there is
no need to show mens rea in respect of the occurrence of death. Death
is a strict liability element: none the less, culpability lies in respect of
the entire offence. One who causes death by driving dangerously is
9 Pace LordMustill in Kingston itself, at 365: “In respect of some offences the mind of the defendant,
and still less his moral judgment, may not be engaged at all. In others, although a mental activity
must be the motive power for the prohibited act or omission the activity may be of such a kind or
degree that society at large would not criticise the defendant’s conduct severely or even criticise it at
all. Such cases are not uncommon. Yet to assume that contemporary moral judgments affect the
criminality of the act, as distinct from the punishment appropriate to the crime once proved, is to
be misled by the expression ‘mens rea’, the ambiguity of which has been the subject of complaint for
more than a century. Certainly, the ‘mens’ of the defendant must usually be involved in the offence;
but the epithet ‘rea’ refers to the criminality of the act in which the mind is engaged, not to its moral
character.” We can accept Lord Mustill’s analysis that the absence of blame should not entail the
absence of mens rea. Read as an assertion that the absence of blame should not entail the absence
of a conviction, however, we should demur. For insightful discussion, see G. Sullivan, “Making
Excuses” in A.P. Simester and A.T.H. Smith (eds.), Harm and Culpability (Oxford 1996), 131.
10 Kingston, at 375–7.
11 (1983) [1987] 3 All E.R.411 (CA).
12 [1988] 1 A.C. 130 (PC).
13 For criticism of that approach, see A.P. Simester, “Mistakes in Defence” (1992) 12 O.J.L.S. 295.
14 Similarly, in the context of medical necessity, see the argument by A. Ashworth, “Criminal Liability
in a Medical Context: the Treatment of Good Intentions” in A.P. Simester and A.T.H. Smith
(eds.), Harm and Culpability, 173.
15 Above, text at n. 2.
16 [1899] 1 Q.B. 7, 14. (Unfortunately, as we noted earlier, it is a rule plagued by exceptions.)
17 Contrary to s. 1 of the Road Traffic Act 1988.
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normally culpable in respect of that death – because it is precisely such
risks that make it wrong to drive dangerously in the first place.18
BEYOND CULPABILITY
So we may quibble about the close – too close – identification that is
sometimes made between mens rea and culpability. Admittedly, mens
rea is indispensable to culpability, in that we need more than a bare
actus reus to conclude that a defendant deserves the official sanctions
of the criminal law. Yet the contribution made by mens rea is not
sufficient either; and its role in establishing fault is not a simple one.
More importantly, however, we should question the conventional
association between mens rea and culpability at a deeper level. Mens
rea is relevant to culpability, yes. But it serves other purposes too,
purposes that are quite distinct and just as important. The existence of
these other functions is too often overlooked, and is liable to be con-
cealed by the depiction of mens rea simply as a “fault” element.
Broadly speaking, mens rea serves two main classes of function, and
within that grouping it serves at least four particular functions. First, it
helps to establish the moral innocence or guilt of the defendant’s con-
duct (and as such, affects sentencing as well as conviction). We have
noted already that it does so partly by contributing to findings of
culpability. Additionally, as we see in the next section, sometimes mens
rea constitutes the morally wrongful character of D’s behaviour in
a more fundamental way, by identifying what kind of action D is
performing. In these cases, the finding of mens rea is integral to the
wrong for which D is being held responsible.
The other functions concern liberty. Mens rea has important roles
to play in articulating, and notifying, the limits of citizens’ freedom.
More specifically, one purpose discharged by mens rea is to secure fair
warning to defendants, ensuring they have sufficient advance notice
that, by their conduct, they risk violating the criminal law. Secondly,
mens rea plays a key mediating role in criminalisation, being part of
the trade-off between the protection of potential victims and the pres-
ervation of liberties for potential defendants.
These further roles often demand more stringent mens rea stan-
dards for liability than is needed to establish culpability. They help to
explain why negligence, and sometimes even recklessness, is excluded in
certain contexts of the criminal law, notwithstanding that one so acting
might be culpable. In what follows, we discuss each role in turn.
18 See further A.P. Simester, J.R. Spencer, G.R. Sullivan, and G.J. Virgo Simester and Sullivan’s
Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine, 4th ed. (Oxford, 2010) · 6.5 (hereafter Simester and Sullivan).
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ESTABLISHING THE WRONG
The second function sometimes performed by mens rea, then, is to
establish the morally wrongful nature of a defendant’s behaviour. As a
general proposition, criminal conduct must be wrongful. It must be the
kind of behaviour that a person ought not to do,19 for which blame and
punishment are potentially apt. We don’t blame people for doing good
things. We blame them only for doing things that are morally wrong.
Notice that this is not just a point about culpability. There is a general
objection to punishing the blameless in criminal law, but conclusions
of blamelessness can be attributable to different sources. One may be
blameless because, although one’s conduct was wrongful, one was not
culpable in respect of that conduct – as when one lacked mens rea, or
had an appropriate excuse. But one may also be blameless because
one’s conduct was not wrongful in the first place. Thus the primary step
is to establish whether the conduct is suitable for blame at all. This
primary step not only affects conclusions about the defendant’s moral
position; it also shapes the justificatory rights of others to assist or
resist him.
But what makes conduct wrongful? Let’s start by thinking about the
actus reus in isolation. Often the answer is straightforward. What
makes D’s behaviour problematic, and a candidate for potential
blaming judgments, is some observable harm that it causes. If D breaks
V’s arm, or vandalises his property, the conduct is undesirable – the
actus is reus – just in virtue of its external elements, and independently
of D’s mens rea. In these kinds of cases, the conduct is the very source
of the wrong. Correspondingly, the criminal law’s interest in preventing
such conduct arises out of the harmful nature of the actus itself. These
are the classic types of cases likely to influence us toward thinking of
mens rea as a fault element. The actus reus establishes the harm; and we
can move directly to the second stage, of establishing culpability.
On other occasions, however, the actus is not inherently reus. The
external elements of D’s conduct may not by themselves disclose
anything wrongful or undesirable. Suppose that D stalks toward V
with fist drawn back. What is the moral character of D’s conduct? It
depends. Perhaps D intends to strike V. Or perhaps D is a criminal law
professor, acting out a scenario in order to demonstrate the moral
ambiguity of such cases to his students. Whether D’s conduct is a
wrong of attempted assault depends on D’s intentions. It is only if he
means to strike that D’s otherwise lawful conduct becomes a wrong.
The same is true of theft. Picking up a glass of beer from the bar
counter is not the stuff of theft, although it is the actus reus of theft.
19 Cf. Simester and Sullivan ch. 1.
C.L.J. Four Functions of Mens Rea 385
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 15 Mar 2012 IP address: 137.205.50.42
It lacks the nature of theft, unless and until it is done dishonestly with
intent to deprive. In cases like these, D’s mental state is integral to the
moral character of his action. Without it, there is no reason to think of
his conduct as wrong, as the kind of morally problematic conduct that
warrants preventive measures by the state.
Helping to constitute the wrong is a standard role for mens rea.
Consider, for example, the former English law of indecent assault. In
Court,20 D placed a 12 year old girl, fully clothed, across his knees and
beat her on the buttocks. The House of Lords ruled that such conduct,
if a disciplinary measure, was a mere assault; but if done for sexual
gratification, the assault was indecent. The decision allows that some
actions are not, by their external elements, inherently wrongful, but
are capable of being made wrongful when done for certain kinds of
reasons. Court’s ulterior motivation was not a fault constituent.
Rather, it made his conduct the kind of wrong it was.
There are many examples like Court to illustrate that the character
of an action cannot always be determined by reference to its external,
actus reus features alone. Glanville Williams put the point more
generally: ‘the act constituting a crime may in some circumstances be
objectively innocent, and take its criminal colouring entirely from the
intent with which it is done.”21 Where that is so, the law may have no
regulatory interest in D’s conduct unless it is done for certain reasons.
For these varieties of crime, mens rea does not operate simply to
establish fault (although it also does that): because, in itself, the actus
reus does not specify a wrong. It is only when accompanied by mens rea
that there is an action meriting the attention of the criminal law. As
such, the mens rea requirement does far more than simply establish a
connection between the eventual harm and D’s culpability.
Our modern criminal law contains some very important classes of
offences that involve mens-rea-dependent wrongs.22 These include
most economic wrongs, such as exploitation and predatory behaviour;
and indeed blackmail, where the distinction between a threat and a
warning depends on the defendant’s motivation.23 To some extent the
dependence of economic wrongs on mens rea is an inevitable feature
of marketplace transactions, where the actions of an economic actor
are always likely to affect the interests of others. D may know that,
by pricing her goods lower, she will take business away from V, and
perhaps even force V out of business. Yet D does no wrong unless
she prices her goods accordingly in order to drive V out of business.
20 [1989] A.C. 28.
21 Criminal Law: The General Part, 2nd ed. (London 1961), p. 22.
22 Especially in ulterior intent crimes. See J. Horder, “Crimes of Ulterior Intent” in A.P. Simester and
A.T.H. Smith (eds.), Harm and Culpability, 153.
23 Cf. G. Lamond, “Coercion, Threats, and the Puzzle of Blackmail” in Simester and Smith, ibid., 215.
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Here, the distinction between a side-effect of economic activity and an
intended effect is central to our assessment of the wrongfulness of
D’s conduct. V’s economic interests are by their nature exposed to the
adverse effects of others’ economic activity: there is no general duty to
avoid injury to economic interests, and the mere fact that those inter-
ests are harmed cannot establish that D’s act wrongs the victim. Hence
it is only the intention with which D acts that makes her conduct
properly described as a (wrongful) attack on V. In a broadly free
market, persons are left alone to pursue their own interests. In so doing,
they wrong no-one even if their self-advancing conduct has deleterious
side-effects for others. Those side-effects are a natural feature of com-
petitive interaction. However, where they are deliberately sought, D is
no longer pursuing her own interests but, instead, attacking the inter-
ests of others. That is morally wrongful; and it is wrongful even if she
attacks those interests merely in order to advance her own position
(a characteristic of wrongs such as dumping).
Another significant class of intention-dependent wrongs comprises
pre-emptive crimes. Pre-emptive crimes seek to prohibit conduct that is
not in itself harmful, but which becomes problematic when perpetrated
for nefarious ends. There is nothing wrong with buying fertiliser; but if
done with intent to make a bomb, an offence is committed against
section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006.24 Pre-emptive offences often
involve a trade-off between actus reus and mens rea. Sometimes, it will
be better to criminalise a more specific actus reus, e.g. possession of an
automatic firearm. The more precisely defined offence offers better,
more detailed guidance to citizens about their freedoms and obliga-
tions, letting them know where the law stands by marking out what
counts as wrongful conduct clearly in advance. But as the inchoate law
of attempts itself demonstrates, sometimes this precision about the
actus reus is not available. In such cases, we rely on the defendant’s
intention to help mark out those inchoate acts that are wrongs, and
which constitute a criminal attempt, or a crime against the Terrorism
Act 2006, or some other preparatory offence. Moreover such intention-
rich offences, despite their intangible actus reus, will frequently supply
greater accuracy when labelling D’s criminality, because they more
clearly identity the moral character of D’s behaviour.25 A conviction of
some (hypothetical) offence of buying controlled fertilizer may not
adequately describe D’s wrongdoing in a case where D’s intention was
to manufacture a bomb. In such cases, doctrines of mens rea enable the
24 Section 5 creates an offence of preparation of terrorist acts. According to subsection (1), “a person
commits an offence if, with the intention of (a) committing acts of terrorism, or (b) assisting
another to commit such acts, he engages in any conduct in preparation for giving effect to his
intention.”
25 Cf. A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 6th ed. (Oxford 2009) · 3.6(s); Simester and Sullivan ·
2.4 (“fair labelling”).
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law to establish flexible prohibitions while controlling the risk of
attaching liability to morally innocent conduct.
FAIR WARNING
Let us turn now to the second class of mens rea functions, which con-
cerns the protection of citizens from state intervention. One form of
contribution is through what scholars often call the “fair warning”
principle.26 This is not quite the same as the overlapping principle that
the liability of citizens should be ascertained by determinate legal rules,
and we need to begin by getting that distinction clear. Both involve rule
of law values. The latter, which is sometimes known as the principle of
legality, requires that no-one should be convicted of any offence unless
a law exists that designates her conduct a crime: nullum crimen sine lege,
no crime without law. It also requires that the law should be prospec-
tive, not retrospective. Nowadays, it is a constitutional matter: the
common law contains a presumption against retrospective crimes,
buttressed by Article 7 of the ECHR, which plainly interdicts retro-
active criminal laws. The law, especially the criminal law, should be
fixed and definite, not alterable. The potential for criminal liability of
a would-be actor should exist before she acts, not originate in the
subsequent discretion of others.
The legality principle requires that liability should be determined by
the rule of law, and not the rule of officials. By contrast, concern for
fair warning brings out a slightly different dimension of the rule of law:
that its rules should offer advance guidance to the persons who are
subject to them. An unpublished law may be constitutionally valid, for
instance, but it is defective as part of a system of rules designed to guide
society’s behaviour – like the doomsday device in Dr Strangelove, it
fails as a deterrent. The distinction is helpfully brought out by Lord
Bingham in Rimmington and Goldstein:27
There are two guiding principles: no one should be punished under
a law unless it is sufficiently clear and certain to enable him
to know what conduct is forbidden before he does it; and no
one should be punished for any act which was not clearly and
ascertainably punishable when the act was done.
Bingham’s second principle is the basic constitutional one: that if
something is not illegal, no liability can follow even if it ought to
be illegal, and indeed even if most people thought it was.28 His first
26 See, e.g., Simester and Sullivan · 2.3 and citations there.
27 [2005] UKHL 63, [2006] 1 A.C. 459, [33].
28 It is this second, constitutional principle that is especially worrying about the decision in C [2004]
EWCA Crim 392, [2004] 1 W.L.R. 2098, where C appealed his conviction in 2002 of raping his wife
in 1970. Relying on the House of Lords’ decision in R. v. R [1992] 1 A.C. 599 (below in the text), the
Court of Appeal simply pronounced (at [22]) that “the stark fact is that R was convicted. … The
388 The Cambridge Law Journal [2011]
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 15 Mar 2012 IP address: 137.205.50.42
principle, on the other hand, concerns predictability and fair warning.
Individuals need to be able to predict the legal implications of their
actions in advance, so that they have fair warning that their contem-
plated actions will risk incurring a criminal sanction; so that they know
where they stand and can properly decide what to do in light of the
law’s guidance. With secure, reliable law, citizens are enabled to steer
clear of criminal liability by choice, to navigate their way through life
without unexpected legal consequences befalling them. Absent such
law, the ability to plan one’s life is undermined.
There is a growing tendency to constitutionalise this principle too.
Fair warning ordinarily requires not only that criminal laws exist pro-
spectively, but also that they be stated clearly and in a reasonably
precise fashion. Extending the Article 7 jurisprudence, the European
Court has emphasised the aim that “the individual can know from the
wording of the relevant provision and, if need be, with the assistance of
the courts’ interpretation of it, what acts and omissions will make him
liable.”29 That ambition seems hard to contest. None the less, caution is
appropriate here. The goal of fair warning is not to ensure textual
certainty for its own sake. What really counts is whether D can antici-
pate liability in the case at hand – whether criminal liability comes as a
surprise, as something contrary to ex ante expectations.30 A focus on
predictable liability rather than legislative clarity leaves space for what
Andrew Ashworth calls a “Thin Ice” principle:31
A rounded view of the doctrine of criminal law must, however,
look further than the cluster of three legality principles. If one of
the aims of the criminal law is to convict those who culpably cause
harm, this constitutes a policy goal which should form part of the
doctrine of criminal law and which may properly enter into deci-
sions on interpretation. The claim here is not that criminal laws
should be extended retrospectively to citizens’ conduct, but rather
that people who knowingly “sail close to the wind” should not be
surprised if the law is interpreted so as to include their conduct.
This may be termed the “thin ice” principle, after the dictum of
LordMorris that “those who skate on thin ice can hardly expect to
find a sign which will denote the precise spot where he [sic] will fall
in.”32 Surely this argument might properly militate against a re-
strictive construction: the essence of the non-retroactivity prin-
ciple is that the courts should not frustrate justified expectations,
decision [by their Lordships] applied to events that had already taken place, as well as those in the
future.”
29 Kokkinakas v. Greece (1993) 17 E.H.R.R. 397, 423. Cf. G v. Federal Republic of Germany 60 D.R.
252, 262 (1989); Misra and Srivastava [2004] EWCA Crim 2375, [29]–[34].
30 Cf. John Gardner’s introduction to H.L.A. Hart’s Punishment and Responsibility 2nd ed.(Oxford
2008) xxxvi: “the law must be such that those subject to it can reliably be guided by it, either to
avoid violating it or to build the legal consequences of having violated it into their thinking about
what future actions may be open to them.” (Emphasis added.)
31 “Interpreting Criminal Statutes: A Crisis of Legality?” (1991) 107 L.Q.R. 419, 443.
32 Knuller v. D.P.P. [1973] A.C. 435, 463.
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and these should not exist in controversial or manifestly doubtful
cases.
To be sure, obscure or discretionary (or retroactive) laws are likely to
be insufficiently predictable, likely to offer inadequate ex ante guidance
to citizens. But, if the objection is one of fair warning rather than
the constitutional one of retroactive criminalisation, disappointing the
ex ante expectations of a defendant may carry no weight when those
expectations are unjustified. And expectations may be unjustified
because of the kind of conduct the defendant contemplates, not just
because of clearly-drafted prohibitions. One illustration of this is the
well-known decision in R. v. R,33 where the House of Lords rejected
spousal immunity in the common law crime of rape, thereby upholding
the defendant’s conviction of attempting to rape his wife. The decision
is defensible on a thin-ice basis: when interpreting the current law of
rape, R’s anticipation of a legal immunity generated no reason for the
courts to find one. It should have made no difference had R obtained
an opinion from a lawyer, immediately prior to making his wife submit
to intercourse, that in legal terms he would not be committing rape. His
conduct was profoundly wrong, the very wrong of rape. This is not to
say that courts may invent law retroactively in order to catch husbands
who rape their wives. (That would violate the constraint of legality.34)
But it is to say that, in considering what the current law is, the fact
that the defendant thought it was different does not count for much in
circumstances like these.35 The goal of fair warning is met here.
Understood in this wider sense, of liability’s being anticipatable and
not surprising, fair warning is also supported by mens rea require-
ments. H.L.A. Hart saw this clearly.36 Indeed, for Hart, warning rather
than fault is the basic function of mens rea. By proving intention or
recklessness, the prosecution establishes that D chose to perpetrate
the actus reus; this, in turn, serves to ensure that D had (and rejected)
the opportunity to avoid wrongdoing, and so to evade the attentions
of the criminal law.37 Perhaps Hart exaggerated. Certainly, he under-
estimated the distinctive importance of fault in the criminal law.38 But
he was right to observe that, by ensuring that the defendant has notice
of his actions, mens rea requirements foster the rule of law.
33 [1992] 1 A.C. 599.
34 Which is effectively what happened in C (above, n. 28).
35 Cf. Simester and Sullivan · 2.3.
36 See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, “Punishment and the Elimination of Responsibility” in Punishment and
Responsibility (Oxford 1968) 158, at pp. 181–2.
37 Subject, of course, to the possibility of defences: cf. H.L.A. Hart, “Legal Responsibility and
Excuses” in Punishment and Responsibility, ibid.
38 A point made by J. Gardner, “Wrongs and Faults” in A.P. Simester (ed.), Appraising Strict
Liability (Oxford 2005) 51, at p. 71.
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The fair warning role of mens rea is especially important in the
contexts of result crimes and omissions liability. Crimes of these sorts
often involve no particular form of conduct, no conduct of a kind that
might put the defendant on notice that – lo! – a conviction is at hand.
Result crimes such as manslaughter, or criminal damage, require only
that death, damage, etc., be caused by any act. If I walk into a new
building and switch on the light, I may have no idea that, because of
some fault in the wiring system, an explosion will result, perhaps
causing fatalities. And there is nothing distinctive about switching on a
light to alert me to the potential for danger.
The same holds for omission-based liability, which is by definition
activity-unspecific. We do not complain of what the defendant does,
but of what he does not. Yet there are so many ways in which one can
fail to rescue another person, so many things one may be doing instead.
Perhaps I am talking on the ‘phone, or walking to work, or eating my
lunch, and romancing a new friend, or writing an article.… Any of
these things may be engaging my attention while, at the same time, I am
failing to rescue the victim. Easy to see, then, how liability might come
as a shock.
Considerations of fair warning supply one ground why we tend to
restrict omissions liability to specialist actors, such as parents and
doctors. Part of the reason for our willingness to impose positive legal
duties on such actors is that we can expect them, in virtue of their roles,
to be on notice of the need to act; to look out for the interests of those
to whom they owe such duties. Even then, positive obligations have the
potential to surprise. There are so many things that a parent has to do
each day, some involving her children and many not, that we cannot
reasonably expect any parent constantly to be alert to the possibility
that something may be amiss, constantly to be thinking about her
charges to the exclusion of the rest of her life.
Mens rea requirements address this problem by helping to make
sure that the result, or the omission, is not out of the blue. For those
types of crime in particular, there is especial reason why stigmatic
criminal liability should normally be confined to reckless or intentional
wrongdoing. Otherwise, liability for inadvertent harms can make it too
difficult for citizens, even citizens owing specific legal duties, to pursue
their own lives without fear of unexpected criminal charges. If whatever
activity they are engaged in does not itself give them notice of disaster,
then we must rely on mens rea to ensure they have it.
John Gardner, however, would go even further. Advancing what he
describes as “the mens rea principle”, he argues that “criminal wrongs
should be such that one does not commit them unless one intends or is
aware of at least one wrong-making feature of what one is about to do,
such that (assuming one knows the law) one is also alerted to the fact
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that what one is about to do will be of interest to the criminal law.”39
Thus Gardner requires awareness rather than notice. The rationale for
his principle is also rooted in fair warning arguments, along the lines
advanced originally by Hart:40
According to the ideal known as the rule of law, those of us about
to commit a criminal wrong should be put on stark notice that that
is what we are about to do. The criminal law should not ambush us
unexpectedly. Of course, to avoid unexpected ambushes we all
need to know what the law requires of us. For that reason, crimi-
nal laws should be clear, open, consistent, stable, and prospective.
They should also forbid specific actions (not courses of action,
activities, ways of life, etc.). Even all this, however, is not enough
to ensure that those of us about to violate the criminal law are put
on stark notice that we are about to violate it. For we may know
the law and yet have no grasp that what we are about to do might
constitute a violation of it. That is because often we have no idea
which actions we are about to perform. I make a light-hearted
remark and (surprise!) I offend one of my guests. I turn on my
oven and (surprise!) I blow all the fuses. The mens rea principle is
the principle according to which such actions – the self-surprising
ones – should not be criminal wrongs.
There is much to admire in this analysis, including its rule-of-law
commitment to protect subject-citizens from oppressive and unexpec-
ted use against them of the state’s power. But Gardner’s conclusion
now strikes us as being too strong.41 This is for two reasons. First, to
the extent that the rule of law enjoins unpredictable interference by
the State, liability for negligence is reasonably predictable. Moreover,
unless negligence liability be no deterrent, the argument prima facie
deprives victims of protection from similarly unlooked-for intrusions
by other citizens. The demand that notice be “stark” seems unduly
weighted in favour of defendants. At least where the interest at stake is
sufficiently important, as in manslaughter, a mens rea standard of gross
negligence may be defensible.42
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, Gardner’s requirement
that a criminal wrongdoer must intend or be aware of at least one
wrong-making feature of the action neglects the gateway role of some
activity-specific prohibitions. Perhaps the best example of this is rape.
There is nothing wrong, or wrong-making, about sexual intercourse.
But one reason why it is acceptable to criminalise negligence with re-
spect to non-consensual sex, as many jurisdictions have, is that matters
of consent are so closely bound up with the very nature of sexual
39 Ibid., p. 70.
40 Ibid., pp. 69–70.
41 Although his editor was persuaded at the time.
42 This claim assumes that an adequately formulated (gross) negligence standard can take account of
intellectual limitations of the defendant. For related discussion, see Simester and Sullivan · 5.5(ii).
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intercourse that those engaging in sex are, implicitly, on notice that
questions of consent are in play. The context is so intimate that alert-
ness to the will of one’s partner can be expected of every responsible
actor, and a failure to exhibit such alertness is itself ground for con-
demnation. It isn’t like carelessly tossing a stone aside, only (surprise!)
to hear the sound of breaking glass. To make criminal damage an
offence of negligence would be unfair because there is not always
reason to inquire about the circumstances of one’s conduct. Sometimes
the unexpected happens. But sex is a specific activity, and not like
behaviour that happens to cause property damage. It is distinctive in a
manner that generates an immediate and obvious duty to consider
whether one’s partner consents.
Gardner’s principle is absolute, but in our view fair warning con-
straints admit of a trade-off; one in which mens rea plays a part. Notice
of impending criminal liability must be adequate rather than stark.
Some activities are more obviously dangerous than others, some in-
terests more in need of protection. The same holds for omission-based
duties, some of which are more specific than others. The anaesthetist
may be surprised to find that a tube is detached,43 just as the railway
gatekeeper may be startled to discover the gate left open.44 Neither
can complain, however, that these events were unlooked-for. In other
cases, by contrast, it may only be the presence of mens rea, and
in particular of intention or advertence, that guarantees sufficient
warning of imminent liability.
NEGOTIATING THE PARAMETERS OF CRIMINALISATION
The fourth role of mens rea is the least familiar. It too concerns the
relationship of citizens with the state. As well as helping to secure fair
warning, the so-called “fault” requirements in offences can also play an
important role in mediating the scope of the prohibitions themselves,
especially for those offences where the mental element is not required to
identify a wrong.
It is common, indeed too common, for criminal lawyers to think of
the criminal law in ex post terms, where the defendant has already
acted; and our task is to decide whether she satisfies the criteria of an
offence, including all of its actus reus and mens rea components. At this
ex post stage, the temptation is to focus on the particular defendant, the
character and circumstances of her conduct, and on whether she de-
serves punishment for what she has done. Seen from that perspective, it
is easy to conceive of the offence specification as setting the criteria of
punishment. But, as our discussion of fair warning suggested, that
43 Adomako [1994] UKHL 6, [1995] 1 A.C. 171.
44 Pittwood (1902) 19 T.L.R. 37.
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conception is incomplete. The offence should exist even before X is
done. This is because the primary role of an offence is, ex ante, to
articulate a prohibition. Do not do X in future, the prohibition says,
and it backs that up with a threat of punishment.45
This ex ante role is central to the operation of any offence as de-
terrent. It is the threat of punishment, not the punishment itself, that is
meant to deter would-be wrongdoers. The question of punishment only
arises, in a sense, once the prohibition has failed. So we should begin
by considering offences from an ex ante, deterrent perspective: as
measures of criminalisation. (And, when interpreting offences, we
should be less tempted to respond to backward-looking considerations
about the culpability of the particular defendant, and driven rather
more by the forward-looking implications of a given interpretation for
the scope of activity the offence prohibits.)
Seen from that perspective, our point here is that the content of
the prohibition includes the mens rea specification, and that the nature
of its mens rea requirement directly affects the deterrent scope of the
proscription.
By way of example, let us start with a putative offence where
the actus reus comprises sexual intercourse with a person under
the age of 16 years. Consider, next, what this offence leaves us free to
do. The answer depends on its mens rea requirement. If, to commit
the offence, D must intend or know that her partner is aged under 16,
then D is left with considerable freedom of action. She must refrain
from sex only when she knows or purposes that her partner be under-
age.
Contrast a mens rea element of (subjective) recklessness. If reck-
lessness suffices for a conviction, it follows that Dmust refrain from sex
whenever she suspects that her partner may be underage. By contrast
with the knowledge-based offence, the scope of the prohibition is be-
come larger: the former version permits her to proceed despite realising
V may be underage; the latter does not.
All the more so when, as currently under English law, the mens rea
element is negligence. Now D is not at liberty to have sex unless she
takes care to check V’s age. We do not mean by this to suggest that a
prohibition of negligent under-age sex is inappropriate. Our point is
simply that it is broader, more intrusive, and that its wider scope needs
to be justified. Broader still would be the extreme case of strict liability,
in which case D could only be sure of avoiding liability by refraining
from sex altogether.46
45 For a fuller outline of the nature of criminalization, see A.P. Simester and A. von Hirsch, Crimes,
Harms, and Wrongs: On the Principles of Criminalisation (Oxford 2011) ch. 1.
46 Cf. Sexual Offences Act 2003, ss. 5–8 (offences against children under 13).
394 The Cambridge Law Journal [2011]
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 15 Mar 2012 IP address: 137.205.50.42
Similar analysis applies to an actus reus such as causing damage to
another’s property. Current English law leaves people with the latitude
to be careless but not the freedom deliberately to take risks.47 The
difference may look like one of culpability; but it is also, and perhaps
even primarily, a difference of liberty. When contemplating whether to
prohibit conduct, one should not only consider the magnitude and
seriousness of the harms involved. One should also consider the value
of the conduct to be prohibited and the impact of its proscription upon
the freedom of citizens.48 Mens rea elements can help to negotiate these
considerations. They help to balance the invasiveness of a prohibition
against the interests of those whom the law seeks to protect. Setting
a more stringent mens rea requirement means that the prospect of
liability will have less impact on the day-to-day lives of law-abiding
individuals. Simply put, persons will be required to alter their behav-
iour on fewer occasions – e.g., only when they know, or suspect, or
ought to know (as the case may be) about the risk. By pitching the
standard of mens rea higher, we make it easier for citizens to comply
with the law, and we reduce the range of activities they have to sacrifice
in order to avoid the risk of a criminal conviction.49
The criminal law is designed to safeguard us from threats of harm.
But criminal prohibitions are themselves threatening, in so far as they
coercively restrict our freedom. Ordinary citizens must not only be
shielded from the predations of others; they need also to be shielded
from the state, which should not intrude upon their everyday, innocent
activities. Quite apart from its other roles, the requirement of a mental
element has an important function to play in keeping citizens outside
the scope of criminal prohibitions. Mens rea, that is to say, protects
freedom.
CONCLUSION
Conventionally, mens rea is thought of as a fault requirement. Helping
to establish culpability on the part of the defendant is certainly one of
its roles, and we have no wish to detract from the importance of that
role. Our claim is that it has other roles too. Mens rea requirements can
perform at least four different sorts of function in an offence, and those
other effects need also to be considered when discussing what mens rea
standard ought to be set for a given offence.
Indeed, it is those other functions, and not culpability, that supply
the main explanations why negligence should be used so rarely in
47 Criminal Damage Act 1971, s. 1.
48 The classic study is J. Feinberg, Harm to Others (Oxford 1984); see also Simester and von Hirsch
(note 45 above), ch. 3.
49 For an argument along these lines in the context of complicity liability, see A.P. Simester, “The
Mental Element in Complicity” (2006) 122 L.Q.R. 578, 591–2.
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serious offences. Despite claims by some writers to the contrary,50
it seems plausible to conclude that inadvertent negligence can be
culpable.51 It isn’t a lack of fault that prevents negligence from being
used more commonly. Rather, in some crimes there is no place for
negligence liability because D’s intention or awareness contributes to
making the conduct a wrong. And more generally, limiting the use
of negligence helps to constrain state power, both by reducing the risk
of unexpected liability and by restricting the deterrent scope of the
law’s prohibitions. To appreciate this last explanation, though, we have
to stop focusing on the criminal law as a punishing institution,
and become more willing to think about it from a forward-looking
perspective, as a body of ex ante proscriptions.
Some of the propositions advanced in this essay are familiar. They
should be more familiar than they are. The purpose of this essay is,
primarily, to draw them together. Seen alongside, we hope the points
made here are enough to demonstrate that mens rea is not, uniquely or
even predominantly, about fault. Actus non fit reus nisi mens sit reamay
be a beginning. But it is far from the end.52
50 C. Finkelstein, “Responsibility for Unintended Consequences” (2005) 2 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 579;
M. Moore, “Choice, Character, and Excuse” (1990) 7 Social Philosophy and Policy 28; J. Hall,
“Negligent Behaviour Should be Excluded from Criminal Liability” (1963) 63 Col. L.R. 632;
J.W.C. Turner, “The Mental Element of Crimes at Common Law” in L. Radzinowicz and J.W.C.
Turner (eds.) The Modern Approach to Criminal Law (London 1948) 195.
51 See, e.g., A.P. Simester, Can Negligence be Culpable?” in J. Horder (ed.), Oxford Essays in
Jurisprudence (4th Series, Oxford 2000) 85.
52 We are very grateful indeed for the penetrating comments and suggestions of Bob Sullivan on an
earlier draft. Research for the essay was supported by a Singapore MoE Tier One Research Grant
(R241000045112).
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